Kantian Consequentialism

Kantian Consequentialism
by David Cummiskey

# Hardcover: 208 pages
# Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (January 18, 1996)


"A major contribution to moral philosophy. It is an impressive, original, and stimulating book.--Shelly Kagan, University of Illinois, Chicago

"The deontological nature of Kantian moral theory is challenged in this provocative book by David Cummiskey...This is a bold book that provides careful and provocative arguments...[O]ne should look forward to further defense and development from its author."--Ethics

"This is a richly interesting and well-researched book. It contains provocative and important arguments concerning central elements of Kantian ethics, agent-centered constraints, and a new form of consequentialism."--The Philosophical Review

Product Description
The central problem for normative ethics is the conflict between a consequentialist view--that morality requires promoting the good of all--and a belief that the rights of the individual place significant constraints on what may be done to help others. Standard interpretations see Kant as
rejecting all forms of consequentialism, and defending a theory which is fundamentally duty-based and agent-centered. Certain actions, like sacrificing the innocent, are categorically forbidden. In this original and controversial work, Cummiskey argues that there is no defensible basis for this
view, that Kant's own arguments actually entail a consequentialist conclusion. But this new form of consequentialism which follows from Kant's theories has a distinctly Kantian tone. The capacity of rational action is prior to the value of happiness; thus providing justification for the view that
rational nature is more important than mere pleasures and pains.
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